REPORTED DECISIONS

Following trial, the Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs and awarded $250,000 in general damages plus prejudgment interest. The Court found that a CTV Consumer Watch report conveyed the false and defamatory meaning that the plaintiffs did not honour their representations, made misrepresentations and were untrustworthy. It rejected the defence of responsible communication for that meaning.

The decision addresses how the order and omission of otherwise true facts can produce a false defamatory meaning, as well as responsible communication, notice to broadcasters under Alberta’s Defamation Act, corporate reputational harm and general damages.

The $250,000 damages award carries $113,452.05 in calculated prejudgment interest, bringing damages and prejudgment interest to $363,452.05 before costs. The plaintiffs were also awarded costs, but the amount of those costs has not yet been finalized.

The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the summary dismissal and permitted Liberty Land’s action to proceed to trial. It found a genuine issue requiring trial and recognized Liberty Land as the substantially successful party for costs.

The decision corrected the approach taken below to hearsay evidence on summary judgment and summary dismissal applications. It held that important prior statements were admissible because the person who made them was available for cross-examination, providing sufficient procedural reliability. It also held that conflicting evidence requiring credibility findings could not fairly be resolved on the written record.

Subsequent Alberta decisions have cited and applied Liberty Land. In O’Donoghue v Fluid Energy Group Ltd, 2026 ABKB 428, the Court expressly referred to “the test articulated in Liberty” when considering hearsay on a summary judgment application.

As appellate counsel, Roger advanced an interpretation of s. 283 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, a cross-border insolvency provision commonly known as the “hotchpot rule.” The issue had not been developed in oral argument before the chambers judge. The Court of Appeal nevertheless exercised its discretion to decide it after finding that the record was unclear, the respondents had been able to refine and present their position, and no prejudice had been alleged.

The resulting judgment is the first reported Canadian decision to interpret s. 283. The Court explained that the provision promotes parity among equally ranked creditors in international insolvencies by accounting for recoveries obtained outside Canada when dividends are distributed through a Canadian bankruptcy, proposal or assignment. The Court also defined the circumstances in which the provision does and does not apply.

The decision was subsequently selected for discussion in the 2025–2026 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act under “Miscellaneous Cross-Border Provisions.”

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal dismissed the respondent’s application to quash and granted Poffenroth Agri leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. The Court found that the proposed appeal had sufficient merit and raised questions of sufficient importance to warrant consideration by the Court of Appeal. It also found that the issues concerning inherent jurisdiction, abuse of process and judicial comity transcended the circumstances of the particular dispute.

The decision establishes a detailed framework for distinguishing final decisions from interlocutory decisions and for determining when leave to appeal may be granted retroactively. That framework has since been applied repeatedly by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in matters involving civil litigation, estates, professional discipline, Indigenous claims, foreclosure proceedings and Anton Piller orders. The decision was published at [2021] 2 WWR 302.

Norman Young and Scott Young applied for permission to bring a derivative action in the name of 1211943 Alberta Ltd., a family holding company, against its director Reta Scheuerman. The Court denied leave, finding that the application was not brought in good faith and that the proposed action was not in the best interests of the corporation.

On the issue of good faith, the applicants had discontinued their proposed claims against the estate of Irene Armstrong. The Court found that her son, Norman, appeared to be acting in his own personal interest regarding his inheritance as opposed to the best interests of the corporation.

On whether a derivative action was in the best interest of the corporation, the Court found a clear Limitations Act defence over much of the applicants’ complaints. The Court also expressed concern that the applicants were unable to quantify the damages they were suing for. Lastly, the Court considered the applicability of the business judgment rule over many of the complaints and found that it was likely to cover many of the decisions made by the respondents.